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 TPP and Environmental Regulation
Errol Meidinger*
I. Introduction
The Trans- Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) provisions for the environment and nat-
ural resource policies have the stated purposes “to promote mutually supportive trade and 
environmental policies; promote high levels of environmental protection and effective en-
forcement of environmental laws; and enhance the capacities of the Parties to address trade- 
related environmental issues.”1 They do so in a particular way, however, and contribute to 
building a specific kind of economic order. To understand the environmental provisions it 
is helpful to understand them in the context of the order they implicitly help to construct. 
This article analyzes TPP’s environmental provisions as elements of a broader project that 
seeks to institute megaregulatory relationships and to drive broad institutional alignment 
through the establishment of megaregional trade agreements. It aims to describe and assess 
the ways in which the environmental provisions help to reconfigure regulatory arrange-
ments among participants in the Trans- Pacific megaregion so as to facilitate cross- border 
business transactions and transnational economic integration, while largely side- stepping 
the environmental effects of increased trade and minimizing new substantive requirements.
Although President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from TPP changes its im-
mediate reach,2 the TPP’s new mantle as the eleven- member Comprehensive Progressive 
Agreement for Trans- Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) continues to represent a powerful model 
for major trade agreements. TPP was originally negotiated at length among a dozen coun-
tries from three continents with quite different economies and interests that together repre-
sented over 40% of world GDP and 25% of global trade.3 TPP also provides a complete set of 
terms in intensively negotiated language, covering a wide range of matters laid out in thirty 
chapters and several annexes, including a chapter devoted to the environment. Because ex-
isting language is often used as the basis for subsequent negotiations, there is good reason to 
* SUNY Distinguished Professor, Margaret W. Wong Professor of Law, and Director, The Baldy Center for Law 
& Social Policy, The State University of New York at Buffalo. This chapter is partly based on an earlier paper en-
titled “Mega- Regional Trade Agreements and Global Environmental Governance: The Case of the Trans- Pacific 
Partnership Agreement” prepared for the Symposium on Global Governance and the Trans- Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, University at Buffalo (Nov. 5, 2016). Comments on that paper by participants in that conference, a 
University at Buffalo Law Faculty Workshop, and additional comments by Daniel Chow, Trina Hamilton, Meredith 
Lewis, Paul Mertenskötter, Margaret Shannon, and Richard Stewart, are gratefully acknowledged, as is support 
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1 TPP, art. 20.2.1.
2 But see Alan Rappeport, “Mnuchin Floats Rejoining Trans- Pacific Partnership, Trade Deal Trump Shelved” 
New York Times (New York, Feb. 27, 2018).
3 Fukunari Kimura and Lurong Chen, “Implications of Mega Free Trade Agreements for Asian Regional 
Integration and RCEP Negotiation” (2016) Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia Policy Brief No. 
2016- 03 https:// perma.cc/ 4X2X- 6BQM.
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believe that TPP will become an important reference point4 and that some of its provisions 
may even be directly incorporated in future trade agreements.5
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section II describes the context in which TPP was ne-
gotiated, including the environmental problems posed by increased trade and the history 
of environmental provisions in trade agreements. Section III summarizes the key envir-
onmental provisions of TPP, in sufficient detail to provide a good overall grasp of them. 
Overall, this chapter’s analysis finds them relatively weak in terms of both substantive re-
quirements and implementation institutions, but acknowledges some potential value to 
including environmental provisions in trade agreements. Section IV analyzes the envir-
onmental provisions in terms of the key concepts of megaregulation, including its par-
ticular liberal vision of state- economy relationships; the process of regulatory alignment, 
economic, and political integration; and engaging and countering Chinese environmental 
policy. Section V concludes that TPP’s environmental provisions, while important, do not 
embody a governance system capable of controlling the relentless degradation of the envir-
onment by continually intensifying economic activity.
II. Trade and the Environment
A. Free Trade Agreements in International Trade Law
TPP is the most recent iteration in a long series of free trade agreements (FTAs) advanced 
primarily by developed countries to reshape the terms of international trade. The main at-
traction of FTAs is that they allow two or more countries to establish special trading priv-
ileges among themselves that are unavailable to other countries, even if they are members 
of the WTO.6 FTAs, and their cousin customs unions, are often used as tools in forming 
geopolitical alliances that extend beyond liberalized trade, and thus should be understood 
as geostrategic arrangements. This is particularly true of the recent spate of “megaregional” 
FTAs (MRTAs), such as TPP, the EU– US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), the EU– Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the 
ASEAN plus- six Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which generally 
include ten or more countries and extend beyond contiguous geographical regions.7 MRTAs 
are aimed not only at reducing traditional trade barriers, but also at shaping various aspects 
of what previously were viewed as mainly internal matters, including anti- corruption 
4 Sikina Jinnah and Abby Lindsay, “Diffusion Through Issue Linkage:  Environmental Norms in US Trade 
Agreements” (2017) 16 Global Environmental Pol 41– 61.
5 Todd Allee and Manfred Elsig, “Are the Contents of International Treaties Copied- and- Pasted? Evidence from 
Preferential Trade Agreements” (2016) World Trade Institute Working Paper No. 8 https:// perma.cc/ ZN84- ZD4H.
6 GATT, art. XXIV.
7 TPP members include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, United States (formerly, and perhaps in the future), and Vietnam. TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership), currently on hold, includes the United States and European Union, with its 28 member 
countries. CETA, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, is between Canada and the EU. RCEP 
(the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) involves Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China (very import-
antly), India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, and Vietnam, and is often seen as a direct competitor for the TTP. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, “Mega- FTAs 
and Plurilateral Trade Agreements: Implications for the Asia- Pacific” in J. Chaisse and others (eds.), Paradigm 
Shift in International Economic Law Rule- Making:  Economics, Law, and Institutions in Asia Pacific (Springer 
Singapore 2017); Daniel C. K. Chow, “How the United States Uses the Trans- Pacific Partnership to Contain China 
in International Trade” (2017) Chicago J Intl L 370– 402.
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policy, business organization law, competition policy, consumer protection, data protec-
tion, domestic environmental law, intellectual property, labor law, and other areas.8
B. Trade Growth and the Environment
A central purpose of trade agreements has always been to stimulate increased trade, and, 
through the operation of the principle of comparative advantage, to increase total economic 
welfare. Practically, this will typically be achieved by countries producing more of what they 
can produce most cheaply and purchasing other products from their trading partners. It 
seems common sense that increased production and resulting increased transportation will 
consume more materials and energy, in turn leading to more environmental harm.9 There 
is a counter theory, which argues that increased production will initially lead to environ-
mental degradation, but then to higher environmental standards due to increased wealth. 
This is the “environmental Kuznets curve,” named for the economist Simon Kuznets, who 
argued in the mid- 20th century that economic development would first increase and then 
decrease economic inequality after a certain level of wealth was achieved. However, the 
environmental Kuznets curve has not fared well under empirical scrutiny, as developing 
countries have manifested highly variable patterns, but rarely shown significantly decreased 
environmental damage.10 Moreover, it is important to understand patterns across both de-
veloped and developing countries in a transnational trading system. Increased trade poses 
risks of countries intentionally reducing environmental regulation to compete with other 
producers (competitiveness effects), as well as having environmental regulations over-
ridden by agreements that privilege international trade (regulatory effects).11
While empirical findings on the environmental effects of liberalized trade are variable, 
there are good reasons for thinking that increased trade adds to environmental problems 
more often than not, and unevenly so.12 In one particularly systematic study, Le, Chang, and 
Park analyzed panel data for 98 countries from around the world for the years 1990 to 2013. 
They found a positive long- term relationship between trade openness, economic growth, 
and particulate air pollution emissions (scale effects). However, they also found that trade 
openness generally had benign environmental effects in developed countries, while having 
deleterious ones in middle and low income countries (composition effects).13
That trade agreements appear to have a propensity to increase environmental damage in 
developing countries places a distinctive normative burden on them. One line of response 
is that developing countries may still be better off than they otherwise would be, since 
they can use acceptance of environmental harm as part of their comparative advantage 
and thereby garner economic growth.14 In a world increasingly committed to the ideals of 
8 Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, and André Sapir, Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential 
Trade Agreements (Bruegel Blueprint Series 2007).
9 Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (Institute for International Economics 1994).
10 David Stern, “The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve” (2004) 32 World Development 1419– 39.
11 Esty, Greening the GATT.
12 Eg Jevan Chermichwan, Brian R. Copeland, and M. Scott Taylor, “Trade and the Environment: New Methods, 
Measurements, and Results” (2017) 9 Annual Rev Econ 59– 85.
13 Thai- Ha Le, Youngho Chang, and Donghyun Park, “Trade Openness and Environmental 
Quality: International Evidence” (2016) 92 Energy Poly 45– 55.
14 Jagdish Bhagwati, “Trade and the Environment: Law, Economics, and Policy” in D. Zaelke and others (eds.), 
Trade and Environment: The False Conflict? (Island Press 1993) 159– 90.
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human dignity and equality, however, and one in which the negative effects of low levels of 
environmental protection are becoming more obvious and more acute in developing coun-
tries, that response is becoming unpalatable. Hence, proponents of trade agreements argue 
that they can be designed not only to minimize environmental harm, but also to reduce it 
from what it would have been absent the trade agreement. Indeed, the United States Trade 
Representative argued that TPP would do so.15
C. Environmental Provisions in Trade Agreements
Environmental provisions in trade agreements date back at least to the GATT of 1947, 
which provided exceptions for otherwise prohibited state measures “necessary to protect 
human, animal, or plant life or health”16 or “relating to the conservation of exhaustible nat-
ural resources”17 provided they did not arbitrarily or unjustly discriminate among countries 
with similar conditions, or function as disguised trade restrictions.18
Affirmative environmental duties appeared in US- involved trade agreements starting 
with the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994 (NAFTA), which included early 
forms of many provisions in TPP. Most were in an environmental side agreement negoti-
ated by the Clinton administration in response to criticisms of the primary text originally 
negotiated by the GHW Bush administration. They included, among other things, com-
mitments to: (1) shared environmental principles and objectives; (2) ongoing cooperation 
on environmental matters; (3) maintaining environmental laws with high levels of pro-
tection and enforcement, and striving to improve them; (4) publishing all environmental 
laws, regulations, procedures and rulings; (5)  public notice and comment on proposed 
regulations; (6)  domestic enforcement procedures to remedy environmental violations, 
including possible private rights to seek redress; (7) a new Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation with authority to investigate parties’ enforcement practices; (8) an investor– 
state dispute resolution (ISDS) system allowing investors from one member state to chal-
lenge in a third- party forum environmental and other laws of another member state alleged 
to discriminate against foreign investments, violate minimum standards of fairness, or 
directly or indirectly expropriate their investments; and (9) potential monetary sanctions 
and trade penalties following an arbitral panel finding of “a persistent pattern of failure 
by [a] Party . . . to effectively enforce its environmental law.”19 This was the first time trade 
sanctions were made available to enforce an environmental duty. The main text also pro-
vided that specific multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)— the Convention on 
International Trade of Endangered Species, the Montreal Ozone Protocol, and the Basel 
Convention on Hazardous Wastes— would trump any inconsistent NAFTA provisions.20
Subsequent trade agreements involving the United States generally followed the NAFTA 
pattern, with minor revisions and clarifications, and moved environmental obligations into 
15 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “The Transpacific Partnership: Preserving the Environment” 
https:// perma.cc/ Z7EY- 6EBR.
16 GATT, art. XX (b).
17 ibid. art. XX(g).
18 ibid. art. XX (chapeau).
19 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Government of Canada, the 
Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America (1993) arts. 34, 35, 
36; Annex 3 https:// perma.cc/ DS29- 454Q.
20 NAFTA, art. 104(1).
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the primary texts. Following the 2006 mid- term election, public debates regarding ongoing 
FTA negotiations with Columbia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea gave rise to the bipar-
tisan “May 10, 2007 Agreement” between Congress and the President that required the in-
corporation of seven named MEAs in all US trade agreements; a binding obligation not to 
derogate from environmental laws in a manner affecting trade or investment; and subjec-
tion of all environmental obligations to the same dispute settlement mechanisms applicable 
to other provisions.21
Since NAFTA, the number of trade agreements with environmental provisions has 
steadily increased. The agreements have drawn upon a common pool of environmental 
norms, which, by one careful estimate, now total nearly 300.22 The average number of envir-
onmental norms in recent trade agreements is in the mid- 60s. New trade agreements tend 
to be based closely on recent ones,23 making TPP an important template for future trade 
agreements and a valuable case for analysis of the current state of megaregulation. This is 
especially so given that the environmental chapter remains almost unchanged in CPTPP, 
despite the United States no longer being present to promote its preferences. As a basis for 
this analysis, the next section provides a detailed look at the TPP environmental provisions.
III. Environmental Provisions in the TPP
Most of the TPP environmental provisions are collected in a chapter titled simply 
“Environment.”24 Several other chapters, particularly on investor– state dispute resolution 
and regulatory coherence, also have significant environmental implications. Substantive 
topics addressed in Chapter 20 cover a relatively wide range, including: endangered spe-
cies protection; illegal timber, fish, and wildlife trafficking; marine pollution control; ozone 
layer protection; fisheries subsidies; environmental law enforcement; general environ-
mental cooperation; and increased environmental technology transfer. Climate change is 
not mentioned, although the importance of “transition to a low emissions economy” and 
cooperation on matters such as energy efficiency, low emissions technologies, sustainable 
transport, and the like are acknowledged.25
A. General Obligations
The specific topics just noted are preceded by an article on “general commitments.” After 
restating the customary international law maxim affirming “the sovereign right of each 
Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and its own environ-
mental priorities, and to establish, adopt or modify its environmental laws and policies,”26 
the Agreement states three general duties. First, “[e] ach Party shall strive to ensure that its 
21 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy (2007) (incorporated 
in HR 1314 by substitute amendment and passed on May 22, 2007).
22 Jean Frédéric Morin, Joost Pauwelyn, and James Hollway, “The Trade Regime as a Complex Adaptive 
System: Exploration and Exploitation of Environmental Norms in Trade Agreements” (2017) 20(2) J Intl Econ L 
365– 90.
23 ibid.
24 TPP, art. 20.
25 TPP, art. 20.15.
26 ibid. art. 20.3.2.
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environmental laws and policies provide for, and encourage, high levels of environmental 
protection and to continue to improve its respective levels of environmental protection,”27 
echoing similar language in NAFTA.
This provision illustrates the semantic choices involved in articulating a legal duty. 
On one hand the charge is mandatory, as indicated by the term “shall.” On the other, it is 
vague: “shall strive to ensure . . . provide for and encourage . . . high levels of environmental 
protection.” An obvious problem is that it may be difficult to determine whether or not this 
duty has been met. It is possible to argue that any action whatsoever seeking to improve en-
vironmental protection could constitute fulfillment of the duty, regardless of how small or 
ineffectual it is. If so, the obligation, while ostensibly mandatory, would be largely meaning-
less. Conversely, it could also be argued that the duty has meaning— that “strive,” ‘ensure,” 
“high levels,” and so on can be ascertained in practice; or, more importantly, that failure to 
do so can be ascertained.
However, since the actor and complainant are likely to disagree, legal agreements 
often have arrangements for authoritative determination. This is typically done by a third 
party who can produce binding rulings and thereby give meaning to the general or vague 
terms of the duty. The availability of such an authoritative interpreter can be seen as an-
other dimension of a legally binding obligation. Thus, in assessing a duty or right in a 
trade agreement, it is helpful to look at its levels of: (1) obligation (mandatory language), 
(2) precision (clarity of duty), and (3) institutionalization (mechanisms for elaboration 
and adjudication).28
In general, TPP has relatively weak institutional arrangements for adjudicating compli-
ance with the environmental chapter. Only member countries can bring official complaints, 
and only after engaging in an elaborate series of increasingly high level consultations. 
These begin with party- to- party consultations, then move up to representatives on the 
Environment Committee (composed of senior trade and environment officials from each 
party), and then to top level ministerial consultations.29
If such consultations among the parties fail, disputants can resort to the agreement- 
wide dispute settlement procedure laid out in Chapter 28. While the process has variants, 
and allows the parties to opt for alternative forms of dispute resolution, its main settle-
ment mechanism is the classical three member arbitration panel: one member chosen 
by the complaining party, one by the responding party, and a third either by the com-
plainant and respondent together or, failing that, by their chosen two panel members.30 If 
the panel concludes that the responding party has failed to meet its obligations under the 
Agreement, the respondent is to correct the problem within a reasonable time. If it does 
not, the complaining party can suspend benefits of the agreement to the respondent (for 
example, tariff reductions) proportional to the level of the violation, subject to review by 
the panel.
The arbitral panel is a standard dispute settlement institution for international agree-
ments. Here it is potentially more potent than in most MEAs, because violations of the 
environmental commitments can potentially result in trade sanctions. However, its effect-
iveness in this area remains subject to considerable doubt, since research has uncovered no 
27 ibid.
28 Kenneth W. Abbott and others, “The Concept of Legalization” (2000) 54 Intl Org 17– 35.
29 TPP, arts. 20.19, 20.20, 20.21, 20.22, 20.23.
30 TPP, art. 28.9 ff.
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instance of the dispute settlement procedure actually being used to enforce environmental 
obligations in a trade agreement to which the United States is a party.31
TPP also provides opportunities for individuals or organizations within (but only 
within) member states to submit complaints regarding their state’s implementation of the 
environment chapter. While it would be new for some countries, that process is limited to 
public disclosure. The party receiving the submission (that is, the country whose behavior 
is complained of) must respond in writing within a reasonable time and publicize both the 
submission and its response.32 There is no obligation to give reasons for such decisions. 
Submissions and responses are not evaluated by third parties, although they can be re-
viewed by the Committee on Environment if a member state other than the one complained 
of requests such a review.33 However, unlike the Secretariat in the US– Peru trade agreement 
and several others,34 the Committee apparently has no authority to create a factual record. 
The provision relies entirely on publicity to prompt any changes in party behavior. Parties 
are also free to make citizen submissions more onerous by requiring that submitters ex-
plain how the issue raised affects trade or investment between the parties,35 an evidentiary 
requirement that may be difficult for many submitters to fulfill, as discussed regarding the 
“effective enforcement” provision below.
A second general obligation in Chapter 20 is that “[n] o Party shall fail to effectively en-
force its environmental laws through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction 
in a manner affecting trade or investment between the parties.”36 While this provision is 
also vague, “effective enforcement” seems a potentially more demanding and more deter-
minate duty than “strive to ensure.” It too, however, is subject to significant loosening. First, 
the only enforcement failures covered are those “affecting trade or investment between the 
parties.” Second, the next paragraph recognizes parties’ rights to “exercise discretion re-
garding: (a) investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory and compliance matters; and (b) the al-
location of environmental resources with respect to other environmental laws determined 
to have higher priorities.”37 Enforcement decisions and resource allocation are traditionally 
areas of high discretion in administrative law, so it is not surprising that high discretion is 
preserved here. Nonetheless, the paragraph defines compliance as “reasonable” exercises of 
prosecutorial discretion and “bona fide” resource allocation decisions in accordance with 
national enforcement priorities, thus imposing at least some nominal limitations on ad-
ministrative discretion.
31 Chris Wold, “Empty Promises and Missed Opportunities: an Assessment of the Environment Chapter of the 
Trans- Pacific Partnership” (2016) https:// perma.cc/ 7CRW- EY4Q. Professor Wold, an authority in this field, con-
firmed that this finding still holds in an email communication of January 26, 2018. Moreover, until very recently, 
the US was effectively the only developed country that sought to attach possible trade sanctions to violations of 
environmental obligations in trade agreements. R. V. Anuradha, “WTO to the TPP: Evolution of Environmental 
Provisions in Trade Agreements” in J. Chaisse and others (eds.), Paradigm Shift in International Economic Law 
Making: Economics, Law, and Institutions in the Asia Pacific, (Springer Nature Singapore, 2017). Thus, while com-
prehensive research covering every trade agreement in existence does not appear to be available, this research on 
agreements in which the US is involved can be treated as indicating that there have been very few, and very prob-
ably no, trade dispute processes over environmental provisions.
32 TPP, art. 20.9.1.
33 TPP, art. 20.9.4.
34 US Government Accountability Office, “Free Trade Agreements:  Office of the US Trade Representative 
Should Continue to Improve Its Monitoring of Environmental Commitments” GAO- 15- 161 (Nov. 2014).
35 TPP, art. 20.9.2.d.
36 TPP, art. 20.3.4.
37 TPP, art. 20.3.5.
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Application of this provision seems likely to be challenging in practice. While there have 
been no disputes involving the environmental enforcement requirement, a recent decision 
of a dispute panel regarding a very similar labor requirement,38 held that the United States, 
in claiming that Guatemala failed to effectively enforce its labor laws, would have to show 
that those enforcement failures conferred an empirically demonstrable competitive advan-
tage on the non- enforcing party. Because it managed to do so in only one of eight instances, 
it did not meet the dual requirements of showing (1) “a sustained or recurring course of 
action” that (2) also affects trade by conferring a competitive advantage.39 The challenge 
in the environmental context would likely be at least as great, since it would be difficult to 
demonstrate a sustained or recurring course of action in the first place— especially without 
the equivalent of worker groups to complain, and then even more so to show empirically 
that such a course of action created a competitive advantage.
Third, TPP seeks to establish a constraint on the weakening of national environmental 
law for the purpose of enhancing competitive advantage: “a Party shall not waive or other-
wise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, its environmental laws in a 
manner that weakens or reduces the protection afforded in those laws in order to encourage 
trade or investment between the Parties.” While this provision can be seen as seeking to place 
a ratchet constraint on any potential race to the bottom, it is limited by the phrase “in order 
to . . .,” which implies a need both to show intent and to show an intent specifically directed 
to increasing trade or investment with the relatively few other parties to the agreement.
As a practical matter, such questions of state intent will always be difficult to prove. 
International trade jurisprudence in general has struggled with whether to require an em-
pirical showing of intent on the part of the acting country or essentially to infer intent from 
action, which seems likely to make the conclusion equally arbitrary.40 Whether this provi-
sion has any practical effect will be interesting to see. On one hand, it is possible to imagine 
parties jealously observing each other’s environmental regulatory behavior and bringing 
claims when they feel aggrieved. On the other hand, parties may be quite hesitant to bring 
environmental claims, both because they are difficult and expensive to prove, and because 
they could trigger retaliation.
B. General Institutional Arrangements
As noted, one of the factors that helps make international agreements binding in practice is 
that they come with a set of institutional mechanisms to help make them happen. In add-
ition to the dispute settlement apparatus described above, there is a general committee— the 
Trans- Pacific Partnership Commission— composed of senior delegations from and selected 
by each Party.41 The Commission is responsible for overall implementation and can create 
38 The CAFTA- DR requirement, art. 16.2.1(a), “A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through 
a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date 
of entry into force of this Agreement,” is identical to that of the TPP, art. 16.2.1(a).
39 Final Report of the Panel, In the Matter of Guatemala— Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 
16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA- DR, Dominican Republic— Central America— United States Free Trade Agreement (June 
14, 2017) paras 503– 507.
40 Robert E. Hudec, “GATT/ WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an ‘Aim and Effects’ Test” 
(1998) 32 Intl Lawyer 619– 49.
41 TPP, art. 27.1.
 TPP and Environmental Regulation 183
183
other ad hoc or standing committees.42 It is to make decisions by consensus,43 meaning “no 
Party present at any meeting when a decision is taken objects to the proposed decision.”44 
This appears to be a fairly strict standard, since it gives each Party an effective veto power. 
This could mean that the Commission will have a hard time making decisions on difficult 
questions. Those may therefore have to be addressed through the dispute settlement pro-
cess, or by general diplomatic activities among the parties, or not at all.
There is also an Environment Committee, composed of senior governmental representa-
tives from the trade and environment ministries of each Party,45 with general and relatively 
vague duties. These include monitoring implementation of the Environment chapter and 
preparing a written report within three years of TPP’s entry into force,46 providing a forum 
for ongoing discussion,47 consulting and coordinating with other committees,48 and the 
like. This Committee also is to operate by consensus, unless it agrees by consensus to op-
erate otherwise.49
This limited power of the committees seems to indicate that the parties will retain most 
environmental questions regarding TPP implementation in their own domains and do not 
intend the treaty apparatus to resolve many of them. TPP simply reiterates a duty to “co-
operate to address matters of mutual interest” with regard to various topics.50 On the other 
hand, the committees will provide forums for regular discussion and over time are likely 
to generate continuing networks for the sharing of ideas and experiences, thus perhaps 
leading to considerable alignment in practice.
TPP also aims to shape the internal functioning of national environmental regulatory 
programs. Each party is mandated to: (1) ensure that relevant information about its en-
vironmental laws, policies, enforcement, and compliance procedures is available to the 
public;51 (2) “ensure that an interested person residing or established in its territory may 
request that the Party’s competent authorities investigate alleged violations of its environ-
mental laws, and that the competent authorities give those requests due consideration”;52 
(3)  “ensure that judicial, quasi- judicial or administrative proceedings” for enforcement 
are available and “are fair, equitable, transparent and comply with due process of law”;53 
(4) “provide appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations of its environmental laws,” 
including the possibility of enforcement suits brought by non- state actors, which would 
be a novelty in many countries;54 and (5) ensure that such sanctions and remedies “take 
appropriate account of relevant factors,” which may include the nature and gravity of the 
violation, damage to the environment and any economic benefit the violator derived from 
the violation.55
42 ibid. art. 27.2.2.
43 ibid. art. 27.3.1.
44 ibid.
45 ibid. art. 20.19.2.
46 ibid. art. 20.9.6.
47 ibid. art. 20.9.3.
48 ibid. arts. 20.14.2, 20.19.3(e).
49 ibid. art. 20.19.5.
50 In reference to TPP arts. 20.12.2 (general); 20.5.3 (ozone- depleting substances); 20.6.3 (ship pollution); 
20.13.6 (biodiversity protection); 20.15.2 (energy efficiency, emissions reduction, etc., all implicitly related to cli-
mate change).
51 TPP, art. 20.7.1.
52 ibid. art. 20.7.2.
53 ibid.
54 ibid. art. 20.7.5.
55 ibid. art. 20.7.6.
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These provisions (public information, complaints procedures, both state and pri-
vate enforcement mechanisms, procedurally fair and transparent adjudication, effective 
and proportional remedies) strongly resemble the typical ideals and features of devel-
oped country environmental regulatory systems, and perhaps of the United States in 
particular.56 The penalty criteria, for example, could have been taken directly from the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency’s penalty policies.57 Moreover, TPP’s 
Chapter 25 on “Regulatory Coherence” urges parties to have their agencies consult and 
coordinate,58 and to conduct regulatory impact analyses assessing the need for new regu-
lations, examining feasible alternatives, considering their efficiency (including possible 
cost- benefit analysis), and relying on the best reasonably attainable information.59 
Chapter 8 requires that “Each Party shall allow persons of another Party to participate in 
the development of technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment proced-
ures by its central government bodies on terms no less favorable than those it accords to 
its own persons.”60
To the degree that these prescriptions and strong recommendations are implemented 
by the parties, they are likely to have the effect of facilitating transactions for trans-
national corporations seeking to do business or establish operations in the member 
states. They will do this through gradually aligning the administrative structure and op-
erations of their environmental regulatory programs with each other and with the gen-
eral pattern advanced by a variety of US and OECD initiatives in recent decades, thus 
making host country regulatory arrangements increasingly legible to transnational busi-
ness actors.
While these prescriptions fit into the “rule of law capacity building” agenda promoted 
by powerful developed countries and financial institutions such as the World Bank,61 the 
movement for environmental rule of law is considerably broader. It ranges from networks of 
environmental officials, such as the International Network for Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement, composed of 4000+ environmental professionals, government and non- 
government, around the world,62 to transnational environmental NGOs, including the 
World Wildlife Fund,63 International Union for the Conservation of Nature,64 and count-
less smaller organizations, all of which have taken the position that improved domestic legal 
institutions are centrally important to improved environmental governance. These provi-
sions therefore seem likely to have some appeal to environmental interests. Nonetheless, 
with the exception of the WWF,65 environmental groups generally have an oppositional 
56 For a more thorough analysis of the use of administrative law to promote harmonization and facilitate trade 
and investment, see Richard B. Stewart and Paul Mertenskötter, “Megaregulatory Ordering through Transnational 
Administrative Law,” ch. 17 in this volume.
57 Eg, EPA, “US EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Clean Water Act:  Section 404 
Settlement Penalty Policy” (Dec. 21, 2001) https:// perma.cc/ K63V- GR7F.
58 TPP, art. 25.7.
59 ibid. art. 25.51– 3.
60 ibid. art. 8.7.1.
61 Tor Krever, “The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory: the Rule of Law and the World Bank’s Development 
Model” (2011) 52 Harvard Intl L J 287– 319.
62 INECE https:// perma.cc/ 5F2T- JF5T.
63 WWF, “WWF Statement on the Close of the Trans- Pacific Partnership Negotiations” (Oct. 5, 2015) https:// 
perma.cc/ G46R- WUXH.
64 Jake Brunner, “Implementing Environmental Policy in Viet Nam: IUCN’s Experience” (2016) https:// perma.
cc/ D3NW- VG7C.
65 WWF, “WWF Statement on the Close of the Trans- Pacific Partnership Negotiations.”
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and critical view of TPP.66 Most have taken the position that the environmental protections 
in TPP as a whole are not as strong as they should or could be, and that the ISDS provision, 
discussed below, is particularly dangerous.67
C. Obligations Tied to Existing Multilateral Environmental Agreements
A portion of Chapter 20 is devoted to linking TPP to existing MEAs to which the TPP 
parties are also parties. These include the Montreal Protocol to Protect the Ozone 
Layer,68 the “MARPOL” convention aimed controlling ocean pollution from ships,69 and 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES).70 For the most part these sections do not articulate new commitments. Instead, 
they generally affirm the importance of the goals of the MEAs and require the parties to 
“take measures” to pursue those goals or, in the case of CITES, to “adopt, maintain, and im-
plement laws, regulations and other measures to fulfill [their] obligations” under CITES. 
In some cases, moreover, the obligations stated by TPP appear to be lower than those that 
have been developed under the related MEAs.71 While this does not alter obligations under 
the MEAs, it does limit the availability of the TPP dispute settlement process. In addition, 
it may be difficult to employ the TPP dispute resolution system to enforce any obligations 
under the MEAs, because the complainant must show not only a failure to implement the 
MEA, but also that it “affects trade or investment between the parties,” a requirement, as 
noted above, that will often be difficult to meet.
It is therefore reasonable to ask why the MEA provisions are even present in TPP, since 
they seem not to add any substantive obligations to the underlying MEAs. A cynical answer 
might be that they are mere window dressing, providing a patina of environmental concern 
in a treaty aimed primarily at expanding environmentally damaging trade and geopolitical 
primacy. A more positive response might be that it is nonetheless significant that these en-
vironmental obligations are present in a megaregional trade agreement, indicating that they 
are inseparable from trade and that trade practices must be responsive to environmental 
protection. The linkage thus furthers the message of sustainable development, in which 
economic progress, environmental protection, and social justice are inextricably linked. 
An additional defense is that TPP should not be used to increase the stringency of MEAs, 
to which there are numerous non- TPP member parties. Moreover, TPP does augment the 
substantive, trade- related environmental obligations of the parties beyond the MEA con-
text, as discussed in the next section. Finally, it could possibly be the case that, while state 
parties would not bring complaints for failure to meet obligations under MEAs, they might 
bring them under TPP, if it is apparent that the failure is connected to efforts to gain com-
petitive advantage. As noted above, such claims apparently have not occurred to date, but 
66 John Ravenhill, “The Political Economy of the Trans- Pacific Partnership: A ‘21st Century’ Trade Agreement?” 
(2016) 22(5) New Pol Econ 1– 22.
67 Ilana Solomon, “More than a Dozen Environmental Organizations Warn of Trans- Pacific Partnership Risks” 
Sierra Club (Oct. 6, 2015) https:// perma.cc/ T3PW- YPU2.
68 TPP, art. 20.5.
69 ibid. art. 20.6.
70 ibid. art. 20.17.2.
71 Wold, “Empty Promises and Missed Opportunities.”
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that does not necessarily preclude them in the future, as competition for participation in 
transnational value chains becomes increasingly intense.
D. Additional Substantive Provisions
TPP takes up a number of environmentally important questions beyond the MEAs in which 
the parties are involved, four of them directly trade related.
1. Invasive species. TPP calls for a preliminary program in which the Committee on 
Environment is to coordinate with the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
to identify cooperative opportunities for information sharing on the movement and con-
trol of invasive alien species.72 It is entirely appropriate that TPP address invasive species, 
since so many of them are carried to the ecosystems they invade by trade. But this is a quite 
limited measure with little prospect of changing trading behavior in the near term and evi-
dently leaving the main priority on unfettered shipping practices. While the committee 
processes could conceivably lead to ameliorative measures over the long term, it would be 
highly optimistic to expect that they will lead to any significant regulatory changes.
2. Marine Fisheries Depletion. TPP appears to be the first trade agreement to address fish-
eries depletion. After tacitly acknowledging that inter- party trade plays an important role 
in fisheries depletion,73 TPP obligates parties to operate fisheries management systems to 
regulate wild capture fishing in a sustainable manner.74 Unlike much of the environmental 
chapter, these duties apply extraterritorially, mandating parties to “promote the recovery 
of overfished stocks for all marine fisheries in which that Party’s persons conduct fishing 
activities”75— that is, potentially in fisheries within the exclusive economic zones of other 
parties, or indeed non- parties, or the open seas.
Also significant is the subsidies section, which bars parties from providing fishing sub-
sidies that “negatively affect fish stocks that are in any overfished condition” or to certain 
specified types of fishing vessels. While this provision is limited to the approximately 32% 
of fish stocks that are classified as overfished,76 and does not address subsidies affecting 
stocks that are declining and likely soon to be overfished, it does establish the shared 
principle of eliminating environmentally destructive subsidies, potentially a very im-
portant advance (especially given the continuing difficulties of the WTO in addressing 
the problem).77
Finally, TPP mandates parties to take various actions to combat illegal fishing practices, 
including cooperating with each other, not undermining regional fisheries management 
organizations, and potentially more importantly: (1) “deter[ing] vessels . . . flying [their] flag 
and [their] nationals from engaging in IUU fishing activities”78 and (2) “implement[ing] 
port State measures.”79 Like most mandatory environmental measures in TPP, “deter” and 
72 TPP, art. 20.14.2.
73 ibid. art. 20.16.1.
74 ibid.
75 ibid. art. 20.16.3.c.
76 FAO, “The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture” (Food and Agriculture Organization 2016) https:// 
perma.cc/ 5F88- FK6T.
77 ibid.
78 TPP, art. 20.16.14.b.i.
79 ibid. art. 20.16.14.c.
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“port State measures” are undefined. However, should parties care enough about them in 
practice, most likely because of their commercial implications, it is possible they could pro-
vide the basis for subsequent definition and elaboration through diplomatic negotiations, 
committee processes, eventual protocols, or even dispute processes.
3. Trade in Illegally Harvested Fish, Wildlife and Plants. TPP follows a recent trend of 
trying to limit the illegal harvesting of fish, wildlife, and plants (whether or not they are 
listed as endangered) by denying access to markets, and thus reducing profitability. Parties 
are to share information and experiences,80 cooperate with each other81 and with non- 
governmental entities,82 increase efforts to protect their own wild fauna and flora,83 and take 
actions to implement their duties under CITES.84 TPP reaches beyond CITES, mandating 
that each Party “take measures to combat . . . trade of wild fauna and flora that, based on 
credible evidence [as determined by the Party], were taken or traded in violation of that 
Party’s or another applicable law [evidently not necessarily even the law of another Party], 
the primary purpose of which is to conserve, protect, or manage wild fauna or flora.”85 The 
CPTPP suspends the “or another applicable law” provision, together with an explanatory 
footnote,86 thus eliminating any duty to control trade in wild flora or fauna taken in viola-
tion of another state’s law.87 It thereby removes TPP as a driver of reciprocal extraterritorial 
environmental law enforcement, and would seem to significantly reduce its attractiveness 
to environmental organizations, many of which have placed great stress on policing illegally 
harvested products from other jurisdictions.88 While countries are still free to do so on their 
own, as the United States currently does under the amended Lacey Act,89 participation in 
TPP is not presently an incentive to do so.
4. Environmental Goods and Services. One way to reduce the damaging and inequitably 
distributed environmental effects of increased trade would be to ensure that consumers and 
producers in developing countries have access to the most environmentally protective tech-
nologies available.90 Currently, that is unlikely to be the case, since advanced technology 
is often subject to restrictive tariffs and is typically patented or otherwise kept exclusive so 
as to maximize its profitability to those who control it. This makes it inaccessible to many 
businesses in developing countries and leads to greater environmental damage per unit 
of production than necessary. While TPP contains a provision “recognizing” the import-
ance of trade and investment in environmental goods and services,91 it does little more. 
The Environment Committee is charged to consider party- raised issues in the area and 
80 ibid. art. 20.17.3.a.
81 ibid. art. 20.17.3.b.
82 ibid. art. 20.17.4.c.
83 ibid. arts. 20.17.4.a and 20.17.4.b.
84 ibid. art. 2017.2.
85 ibid. art. 20.17.5 “Such measures shall include sanctions, penalties, or other effective measures, including ad-
ministrative measures, that can act as a deterrent to such trade.”
86 ibid. Fn. 26: “For greater certainty, ‘another applicable law’ means a law of the jurisdiction where the take or 
trade occurred and is only relevant to the question of whether the wild fauna and flora has been taken or traded in 
violation of that law.”
87 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans- Pacific Partnership, Annex II— List of Suspended 
Provisions https:// perma.cc/ 9K5P- H84K.
88 Eg Raffi Khatchadourian, “The Stolen Forests: Inside the Covert War on Illegal Logging” The New Yorker 
(New York, Oct. 6, 2008).
89 USC §3372(a)(2).
90 OECD, “Invention and Transfer of Environmental Technologies” (OECD Studies on Environmental 
Innovation 2011).
91 TPP, art. 20.18.1.
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the parties are mandated to “endeavor to address any potential barriers to trade in envir-
onmental goods and services.”92 In other words, TPP recognizes the issue, but leaves ad-
dressing it to future developments and to other negotiating arenas, such as the WTO and 
the languishing Environmental Goods Agreement.93
5. Not Addressed. It is important to note that many important transnational envir-
onmental issues are not addressed by TPP. These include, at a minimum: air and water 
pollution other than from ships; climate change and possible carbon taxes; desertifica-
tion; environmental justice; fossil fuel subsidies; genetically modified organisms; haz-
ardous wastes and toxic chemicals; indigenous environmental rights; nuclear waste; oil 
and gas development; persistent organic pollutants; and wetlands preservation. Indeed, 
four of the seven compulsory MEAs in the May 10th Agreement were left out of TPP: the 
Inter- American Tropical Tuna Convention, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the 
International Whaling Convention, and the Convention on Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources.
E. Investor–State Dispute Settlement  
TPP continues the long term pattern of US- involved trade agreements having an investor– 
state dispute settlement provision.94 In essence, this provision allows investors from a 
member state who believe that an action taken by another member state has unjustly in-
jured their investment in that state to bring a claim against the state for the loss incurred. 
That claim is heard not by a court of the state where the action occurred, but instead by an 
ad hoc three- member arbitration panel selected by the claimant and respondent that oper-
ates outside the legal system of the host state.
The proliferation of ISDS provisions has been highly controversial for a number of 
reasons, including: (1) likely panel bias, since the arbitrators are often trade and commer-
cial lawyers who work primarily for businesses rather than for governments or NGOs; 
(2) arbitrariness, since there is no panel continuity or appellate system, together with a rela-
tively low level of transparency and procedural protection as compared to courts in de-
veloped states; (3) protection of environmentally destructive investments (say tar sands 
development) as well as environmentally benign or beneficial ones;95 and, perhaps most 
importantly (4) concern that the risk of high penalties suppresses or “chills” environmental 
and social regulation in host states, particularly poor ones.96 This is not an idle concern. 
While the evidence regarding regulatory chill is too limited to support conclusions about 
how widespread it is or how much it has affected environmental regulation overall, there 
92 ibid. art. 20.18.3.
93 Eg “WTO Deputy Upbeat on Negotiations, Anxious about Appellate Body, NME, National Security Cases” 
World Trade Online (Feb. 11, 2018) https:// perma.cc/ 58DW- HJXM.
94 TPP, ch. 9.
95 Solomon, “More Than a Dozen Environmental Organizations Warn of Trans- Pacific Partnership Risks.”
96 Kyla Tienhaara, “Regulatory Chill in a Warming World: The Threat to Climate Policy Posed by the TPP’s 
Investment Chapter” (Paper presented at the Global Governance and TPP Symposium, State University of 
New York at Buffalo, Nov. 5, 2016). In the case of TPP12, there were also indications that it posed a possibly signifi-
cant increase in claims against the US, since the Agreement would evidently have doubled the number of US- based 
subsidiaries of businesses from other countries that could bring ISDS claims. Public Citizen, “Initial Analyses of 
Key TPP Chapters” (2016) 13 https:// perma.cc/ BP4T- GZ9L.
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is certainly evidence of cases where it exists.97 Moreover, there are numerous documented 
cases of investors directly threatening regulators with ISDS claims.
In partial response, the Investment chapter also provides an apparently broad shield for 
environmental measures:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining 
or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appro-
priate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive 
to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.
Although this provision appears to be protective, research to date suggests that similar 
provisions have not deterred many investors from bringing claims.98 The TPP Investment 
chapter also provides for publication of notices, pleadings, hearing documentation, and 
orders (subject to party claims that information is protected)99 and hearings open to the 
public, except when protected information is discussed. Although modest, these are still 
noteworthy movements in the direction of transparency.
While ISDS provisions provoke strong opposition from environmental, health, and 
human rights groups, among others, and equally strong support from business groups, 
knowledge about their empirical effects remains meagre. Jacobs argues that they are prob-
ably much less important than both sides presume, given that relatively few claims are 
brought (slightly over forty each year recently) in relation to the amount of foreign in-
vestment (stock totaling USD 27 trillion in 2015).100 Foreign investors win approximately 
one- quarter of the time, and average awards are generally quite small relative to claims 
(somewhere between 3 and 10%). Nonetheless, serious concerns about arbitrariness, bias, 
and chilling continue to haunt the TPP ISDS provision. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the CPTPP, 
while retaining ISDS, suspends a number of provisions in the investment chapter.101 The 
primary effect seems to be to exclude investment agreements between investors and states 
from serving as grounds for ISDS claims under the Agreement.
Several alternatives to the current ISDS provision have been suggested. First, a complete 
“carve- out” for environmental regulation could be adopted, similar to the one for tobacco 
control measures which allows parties to shield them completely from ISDS claims.102 
However, distinguishing environmental from non- environmental measures might be sig-
nificantly more difficult, since environmental law can be found nearly everywhere.
A second possible reform would be to move away from the ad hoc structure of invest-
ment arbitration and to establish an investment court system with a dedicated group of trial 
and appellate judges and to greater transparency. Both the EU’s proposals for TTIP and 
97 Gus Van Harten and Dayna Nadine Scott, “Investment Treaties and the Internal Vetting of Regulatory 
Proposals: A Case Study from Canada” (2016) 7 J Intl Dispute Settlement 92– 116. See also Simon Lester, “Brady- 
Lighthizer ISDS Exchange” (Mar. 21, 2018) Intl Econ Law & Policy Blog https:// perma.cc/ F57Z- QVPS.
98 Haydn Davies, “Investor- State Dispute Settlement and the Future of the Precautionary Principle” (2016) 5 
British J Amer Legal Stud 449– 86.
99 TPP, art. 9.24.1.
100 Lesley Jacobs, “Investor- State Dispute Mechanisms in International Economic Law: The Shifting Ground 
for Meaningful Access to International Justice from Private Commercial Arbitration to Standing Tribunals and 
Sectoral Carve- Outs” in Daniel Drache and Lesley A. Jacobs (eds.), Grey Zones of International Economic Law and 
Global Governance (University of British Columbia Press 2018).
101 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans- Pacific Partnership, Annex II— List of Suspended 
Provisions.
102 TPP, art. 29.5.
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the signed CETA include such measures.103 The EU has announced that it is committed 
to establishing a multilateral investment court and is pursuing it in all of its trade negoti-
ations.104 However, while this approach might lead to greater consistency and predictability, 
it remains to be seen whether the frequency and importance of claims will be sufficient to 
persuade the many state parties involved to make the necessary financial and institutional 
investments.
The final alternative would be simply to drop the ISDS provisions from modern trade 
and economic agreements. Given the rapidly increasing requirements for internal institu-
tional reform, and the relatively low number of cases actually brought, ISDS provisions may 
not serve much purpose. This is especially so because the evidence that they significantly 
enhance foreign investment is rather weak.105
F. Non- State Actors Beyond Investors
Although investors have a much larger role in TPP than all other types of non- state actors, 
TPP also makes gestures toward recognizing the importance of the other non- state actors to 
effective global environmental governance. Importantly, these actors are not ontologically 
limited to purely “economic” roles in the way that investors are. Instead, they can also play 
roles in formulating rules to protect the environment, human rights, and the like, as well as 
monitoring, information dissemination, adjudication, enforcement, and evaluation of gov-
ernance policies.
First, the agreement generally endorses corporate social responsibility (CSR):
Each Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or jurisdiction, to 
adopt voluntarily, into their policies and practices, principles of corporate social responsi-
bility that are related to the environment, consistent with internationally recognized stand-
ards and guidelines that have been endorsed or are supported by that Party.106
While this provision offers no concrete guidance and the “should” renders it hortatory, it 
affords CSR a status in international trade discourse. CSR standard setting and reporting on 
corporate environmental performance has the potential to provide significant impetus to 
environmental performance.107 Yet whether TPP’s very soft endorsement is enough to spur 
such movement is quite uncertain.
103 Jacobs, “Investor- State Dispute Mechanisms in International Economic Law.”
104 European Commission, “A Multilateral Investment Court” State of the Union 2017 https:// perma.cc/ 
U9G2- 4C6R.
105 Jason W. Yackee, “Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) 
Law: Do BITS promote Foreign Direct Investment?” (2008) 42(4) L & Soc Rev 805– 32. Interestingly, in a recent 
relatively sophisticated econometric study, Armstrong finds that, while investment treaties do appear to have sig-
nificant effects on cross- border investment, weaker treaties seem to have larger effects than stronger ones, thus 
inviting further research to explain such a counterintuitive pattern. Shiro Armstrong, “The Impact of Investment 
Treaties and ISDS Provisions on FDI in Asia and Globally” in Julien Chaisse and Luke Nottage (eds.), International 
Investment Treaties and Arbitration Across Asia (Brill 2017).
106 TPP, art. 20.10. The investment and labor chapters have similar provisions. TPP, arts. 9.17 and 19.7.
107 Daniel Tschopp and Trina Hamilton, “The Potential Role for Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in 
Trade Agreements” (2012) 32 Soc & Environmental Accountability J 27– 38.
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Second, the Agreement recommends a variety of general “voluntary mechanisms” to en-
hance environmental performance, evidently referring to programs such as forestry and 
fisheries certification.108 Again, it provides little specific guidance, instead offering up a set 
of examples: “voluntary auditing and reporting, market based incentives, voluntary sharing 
of information and expertise, and public- private partnerships.” However, it does use man-
datory language:
[E] ach Party shall encourage: . . . use of flexible and voluntary mechanisms to protect nat-
ural resources and the environment . . . [and] its relevant authorities, businesses and busi-
ness organizations, non- governmental organizations and other interested persons involved 
in the development of criteria . . . to continue to develop and improve such criteria.109
Finally, it urges parties to encourage entities developing environmental product labels 
to make sure they are accurate, scientifically sound, based on relevant international stand-
ards and best practices (echoing the TBT Agreement), innovation- enhancing, and non- 
discriminatory as to origin.110 However modestly and schematically, these provisions 
represent a significant recognition and acceptance of non- state actors’ roles in environ-
mental governance, one which has grown quite rapidly in the past two decades.
IV. The TPP Environmental Provisions and Megaregulation
The megaregulation perspective posits that TPP is primarily an ordering project operating 
on a megaregional scale. Presumptive hallmarks of that project include: (1) propagation 
of a specific liberal vision of state- market relations; (2) facilitation of transnational busi-
ness expansion and integration (market scaling) through alignment of national regulatory 
systems; (3) megaregional economic and political integration; and (4) complex countering 
of and engagement with China’s influence in the Asia- Pacific region.111 At a general level, 
all of these characteristics are apparent in the environmental provisions described above. 
This concluding section explores what they tell us about megaregulation and the political- 
economic dynamics surrounding it.
A. State–Market Relations  
TPP envisions parties involving themselves in a broad range of environmental problems, 
enforcing their environmental laws, strengthening them over time, and not waiving them 
to garner increased trade or investment. They are expected to at least begin addressing cer-
tain problems closely tied to trade, including pollution from ships, invasive species, trade 
108 See generally Errol Meidinger, “Multi- Interest Self- Governance through Global Product Certification 
Programmes” in Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg, and Gerd Winter (eds.), Responsible Business: Self- Governance and 
Law in Transnational Economic Transactions (Hart Publishing 2008).
109 TPP, arts. 20.11.a and 20.11.b.
110 ibid. art. 20.11.3.
111 Benedict Kingsbury and others, “The Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) as Mega- Regulation: Prescriptions 
for the State, Market Scaling, Mega- Region Building, and Geopolitical Ordering in the Asia Pacific” (Conference 
Draft for ASIL Biennial Conference of the International Economic Law Interest Group 2016).
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in endangered and illegally harvested plants and animals, marine fisheries depletion, and 
freer trade in environmental goods and services. However, as described above and in the 
next section, they are to do so with a light touch, and at a distance from business. Economic 
production and trade are the driving forces. Investors from one country who feel aggrieved 
by regulation in another can bring their complaints to free- standing tribunals that have the 
capacity to require regulating states to compensate them. Regulatory agencies are expected 
to follow numerous procedures designed to make them open and responsive to regulated 
interests.112 They are encouraged to conduct regulatory impact analyses and to adopt only 
regulations whose measurable economic benefits exceed their costs. In addition, non- state 
actors are encouraged to play a significant role in the formulation and enforcement of envir-
onmental rules, through such means as corporate responsibility and product certification 
programs. While this composite of features could potentially be called neo- liberal, that label 
tends to sweep aside the ways in which TPP portends an increase in the overall amount of 
environmental regulation in many member countries, as well as increasing connectivity 
and cooperation between the environmental ministries in those countries, thus very likely 
leading to a denser regulatory environment.
This picture is consistent with, and amplified by, many other TPP provisions. The chapter 
on state- owned enterprises (SOEs), for example, broadly seeks to place SOEs on a similar 
footing to non- state- owned firms.113 The underlying idea is to move them toward a model 
of economic actors operating within a common matrix of national and transnational regu-
lation, and to limit state assistance to them to “commercial” forms, such as market rate loans 
and market tested access to capital. Member countries are potentially liable for injuries 
from non- commercial forms of assistance (after the effective date) through the TPP dis-
pute settlement process,114 although what constitutes a compensable injury is hedged with 
many invocations of “significant.”115 At the same time, TPP’s regulatory program does tend 
to favor certain types of industries predominant in developed countries, such as finance,116 
pharmaceutical products,117 and advanced technology generally118 through specific chap-
ters. These chapters generally seek to protect the cross- border flow of investments, and are 
additional manifestations of the alignment/ market scaling process discussed in the next 
section.
B. Regulatory Alignment Facilitating Market Scaling
The bulk of this chapter describes the ways in which TPP can be understood as promoting 
megaregional alignment in environmental regulation. These include mandating high and 
improving levels of environmental protection; adjudicating environmental complaints in TPP’s 
dispute resolution process, thus backing them with potential trade sanctions; providing for 
public information, notice and comment, complaints, adjudication, and sanctioning processes, 
112 Stewart and Mertenskötter, “Megaregulatory Ordering through Transnational Administrative Law,” ch. 17 
in this volume.
113 eg TPP, art. 17.4.
114 ibid. Annex 17- B.
115 ibid. arts. 17.7 and 17.8.
116 ibid. ch. 11: Financial Services.
117 ibid. Annex on Transparency and Procedural Fairness for Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices.
118 ibid. ch. 18: Intellectual Property.
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including non- state ones; banning environmental standards waivers aimed at increasing trade; 
requiring measures to implement MEAs on ozone depletion, ship pollution, and endangered 
species; developing policies for invasive species; protecting marine fisheries; limiting envir-
onmentally destructive subsidies; barring trade in illegally harvested fish, wildlife and plants; 
building increased cooperation on environmentally beneficial technology, and promoting cor-
porate responsibility, non- governmental standards programs, and eco- labeling, among other 
things.
The above processes are likely to take place in a context where there already is a consid-
erable amount of alignment, perhaps even harmonization, across member state environ-
mental regulatory programs. While there appears to be limited scholarship on the question, 
professional folklore suggests that there has been an enormous amount of international bor-
rowing and mimicry in environmental law. This has been facilitated by the rise of the field 
after the widespread establishment of rational- bureaucratic administrative states relying on 
technical rules and expert agencies; the global publication of environmental rules and prac-
tices; and the global movement and interactions of environmental researchers, students, 
officials, and activists. These developments allow scholars to talk about the diffusion of 
regulatory instruments,119 global environmental law,120 reliance on common institutional 
procedures,121 and the importance of transnational networks in the diffusion of regulatory 
practices.122 Thus, in the domain of environmental regulation there may already be a larger 
amount of alignment than is commonly assumed. Nonetheless, this still must be treated 
as an empirical question. Understandably, given its practical difficulty and apparently low 
promise of new theoretical insights, scholars have not concentrated on it.123 Practitioners 
are likely to have a much better sense of the situation, but are not necessarily writing about it.
Regardless of how much alignment already exists, the question remains how TPP might 
facilitate more of it. The Agreement relies on two main mechanisms: (1) legally mandated 
regulatory programs and procedures, often backed by disputing processes and (2) repeated 
transnational regulatory interactions, mainly through the committee system and the con-
tinuing regulatory networks that are likely to grow out of it. The underlying assumption of 
the second mechanism seems to be the now- standard one in international law that repeated 
interactions will lead to shared interpretations, which are then internalized and eventu-
ally become behaviorally binding.124 We can thus understand environmental alignment as 
having two important features. The first is the fostering of a common set of legal goals and 
procedures. Over time this should create legible channels for transnational trade and in-
vestment. The second is to knit together the large array of legal rules and officials across the 
region to create links along which transactions can flow and shared understandings emerge.
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Even with both developments, environmental regulation is likely to remain highly 
complex, even labyrinthine. Most significant economic activities will be subject to a large 
collection of regulatory requirements, which even if aligning, will still vary among (and 
often within) member states. This condition will almost certainly advantage large trans-
national corporations, which can accumulate experience and expertise in navigating the 
megaregional system. The continued unbundling of complex supply chains will be eased, 
but will not be easy.
C. Megaregional Economic and Political Integration
Combined with TPP’s other provisions facilitating increased trade, easier capital flows, ex-
panded and more similar intellectual property protections, and geographically extended 
supply chains, the alignment dynamics described above can naturally be expected to foster 
megaregional economic integration. This integration process has two sides— perhaps 
Janus faced. One promotes the integration of member state regulatory programs through 
the processes described in this chapter, and many others as well. The second facilitates the 
continuing transnational extension of corporate supply chains and investment flows. The 
market remains the foremost ordering mechanism. Governments accommodate and facili-
tate integration by aligning their regulatory systems. As cross- border transactions prolif-
erate, political- economic integration ramifies and solidifies.
D. Countering of and Engagement with China
TPP’s model of environmental regulation as described in this chapter is very different from 
the currently operative Chinese model. The draft RCEP reportedly contains no binding en-
vironmental protection provisions,125 nor do most of China’s existing trade agreements,126 
with the apparent exception of its agreement with ASEAN.127 Although China has an ex-
tensive body of environmental law, recent Chinese practice has been to eschew legal rules 
in favor of “cadre evaluation,” the Chinese system for top- down bureaucratic personnel as-
sessments, to set high- priority, quantitative environmental targets. These are ‘designed to 
mobilize governors, mayors, and state- owned enterprise leaders in every corner of China’s 
massive bureaucracy.”128 While China has made significant strides in environmental pro-
tection over the past decade, it has done so not by enforcing its environmental laws, but in-
stead by enforcing performance targets for high officials. Notably, the setting of targets was 
not new, their enforcement was. Thus, the Chinese approach is a highly discretionary one 
relying on relatively quickly adjustable top- level priority setting.
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TPP’s approach, by contrast, aims at fostering a predictable, transnationally legible en-
vironmental regulatory system in which many types of interests— especially sophisti-
cated businesses— can have an influence, and which acts relatively deliberately and slowly. 
Corporations can then maneuver through the megaregional regulatory system with some 
degree of navigational confidence. It is impossible to predict how these two very different 
approaches will interact in the future, especially since China has indicated some interest 
in joining the CPTPP,129 but it is possible to predict that alignment will be a complicated 
process, and one might produce novel, hybrid forms of megaregional environmental 
regulation.
V. Conclusion
The driving mission of TPP is to facilitate transnational trade, investment, and value 
chain expansion on terms congenial to Western- style businesses, and to do so by creating 
a megaregional regulatory order that protects those activities. Through the many discrete 
provisions described in this chapter, TPP seeks to foster a model of a rational and liberal 
state deploying predictable and moderate environmental regulation that is internationally 
aligned through common procedures and interactions among officials, businesses, and ac-
tivists. This model represents an important step forward by making trade policy inseparable 
from environmental regulation.
The larger dream is that trade expansion driving regional integration might become an 
engine of sustainable environmental protection. Given the very modest, incremental en-
vironmental regulatory program embodied in the TPP, however, the dream is very likely a 
fantasy. It will require other strong regulatory programs, deployed by both states and non- 
state actors, to nest the trading system in a governance framework capable of controlling the 
relentless degradation of the planet by ever- intensifying economic activity.
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